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Detention of Terrorists in the
Twenty-first Century

William K. Lietzau·
1. Introduction

O

f all the instruments of power that may be em ployed to further national interests, nonc yields collateral consequences that are m ore difficult to predict than the unleashing of military force. And with respect to the past decade's use
of that instrument, no consequence has engendered more debate, confusion or
passion than U.S. detention policy. This article attempts to clarify the reasons for
the controversy surro unding the policy--expJaining it primarily as a function of
the nature of twenty-fiest-century warfare, as opposed to competing political or
ideological perspectives, as many claim. It then proffers a vision fo r moving past
the controversy.
At firs t, few recognized the juridical stressors associated with a twenty-firstcentury armed conflict steeped in terrorism; most simply looked to old laws to address this new type of conilict. In this context a rift began to form and grew ever
wider with the years of conflict.] Today, even many nations willing to share with
the United States the burdens of armed conilict have expressed significant discomfort with U.S. JegaJ endeavors related to detention.2 This dissonance and the
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disquiet among our allies have impeded the United States' implementation of its
plans, diminished its effectiveness in fighting terrorism and stymied the important
work that must be done to establish an effective legal regime for the longer conflict
ahead. It is not much of a stretch to assert that the manner in which the United
States and its allies take up these challenges may very well reflect the most enduring impact of the 9/1 1 attacks. Indeed, history teaches that changes in the law often
rank among the most noteworthy consequences of war. The goal, then, should be
first to diagnose correctly the problem confronting the United States a nd then to
identify the prescription that will yield a principled, credible and sustainable detention policy.
The thesis is simple. Authority to detain and regulation of the conditions of detention in the context of armed conflict derive most appropriately from the law of
war. As such, the general rules should be uncontroversial-annies have captured
and detained enemy fighters for years. But toclay's war is different: the enemy is no t
a State, its fighters are not lawful combatants and the end of this conflict is not easily discerned. Extant law of war was not written for today's conflict, and an analysis
of it therefore exposes gaps that offend our twenty-first-century sensibilities. Foremost among the lacunae is the absence of appropriate processes for determining
who can and should be detained and for how long. The solution, then, is found in
today's efforts to identify the process that best ensures that we detain only those we
lawfully can detain and, even then, only those whose threat is so substantial that it
can be m itigated only by detention.

II. Iden tifying the Paradigm
The most fundamental component of controversy associated with the post-91I1
armed conflict is the confluence of legal regimes available to guide detentions.
Soon after 9/ I I, President George W. Bush made clear that he viewed al Qaeda's attack as an act of war,3 the response to which would include military force .4 What
became known as the "global war on terror" had begun. When President Barack H.
Obama took office, he distanced himself from some of the more controversial policies of his predecessor, and he discarded from the conflict's lexicon the terms
"global" and "terror." But he did not abandon the legal framework of armed conflict. President Obama, with deliberate clarity, still used the vocabulary of war
when describing the conflict with al Qaeda,5 including in his Nobel Peace Prize
acceptance speech, where he explained why peace-loving nations sometimes have a
duty to engage in armed conflict.6 Fundamental to understanding U.S. detention
policy over the past decade is the comprehension that authority for detention flows
from the nature of warfare and the law of war that regulates it.
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As such, one would anticipate that anyone captured during an armed conflict
would be dealt with as a prisoner of war, without substantial debate. For centuries,
armies have captured and detained enemy fighters; few, if any, anticipated the dissension that would accompany the practice today. Indeed, on 9/11, the office held
by this author (Detainee Policy) did not exist; basic humanitarian norms associated with wartime detention were well understood by the United States' highly
trained armed forces and a deputy assistant secretary-level position to oversee detention policy would have seemed like substantial overkill.
There are several explanations for the adverse global reaction to such a fundamental and heretofore uncontroversial component of warfighting, but the primary
one is that the very status of this conflict as a "war" has been an issue of debate. The
clarion call to war discussed above has not always been discernible amid the cacophony of other instruments at work-most notably, that oflaw enforcement. In addition to his call to arms, President Bush's first post-9/11 speech included the promise
that terrorists would be brought to justice. 7 President Obama's 2009 Archives speech
similarly suggested a preference for criminal judicial processes. 8 Indeed, prior to
9111, law enforcement had traditionally been the tool of choice for addressing terrorism, both domestically and in the international realm. 9 Many continue to adhere to
the view that law enforcement is the "right" paradigm for the conflict today. IO
This article takes the view that, both in 2001 and today, war was and is the correct paradigm to apply in characterizing the conflict itself and in addressing the issue of detention. On September 12, 2001, the United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution expressly recognizing the United States' right to self-defense. II
Days later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took the unprecedented step of passing a collective defense resolution, citing Article 5 of the NATO
Charter. 12 ANZUS and Rio Pact nations passed similar resolutions,u and the U.S.
Congress, on September 13, enacted a joint resolution authorizing the President to
use "all necessary and appropriate force against those involved in the terrorist attacks of9/11." 14 In the early days after 9/1 1, there seemed to be an almost universal recognition that the felling of New York's tallest buildings and a section of the
nation's military headquarters had ignited an armed conflict in the truest sense.
But acceptance of that paradigm waned as the population at Guantanamo grew.
Indeed, criticism of the "war" paradigm emerged in 2002 as a collateral ramification of criticism of wartime detention policies. First came the Bush administration's decision that captured combatants would not be considered prisoners of
war. IS The apparent limitless geographic reach of the United States' war-making
authorities ("global"), as well as the absence of a clear delineation of the enemy
("terror"), caused substantial concern in the international community that the
rule of law itself was at risk. And yet, although there are substantial flaws in the
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syllogism that leads from discomfort with current policies to denial of the existence
of a war, the suggestion that this can be treated as a law enforcement problem is not
without sound precedent.
First, there is the simple fact that the citizenryofthe United States have not been
witness to long-term law of war detention of enemy prisoners since World War II.
Both the Korean and Vietnam wars involved prisoners detained by our local allies.
Prisoners of war were held for only brief periods of time in the firs t Gulf War, and
detention periods were even shorter in the more limited con fljcts that punctuated
the interludes.
More important, prior to 9/ 11 the principal means for dealing with terrorist attacks-at least those without a clear State sponsor-was that oflaw enforcement.
In 1988, 259 people aboard the plane and lion the ground were killed in the
bombing of Pan American Flight 103. 16 The first Bush administration treated the
problem of apprehending suspects as one of diplomacy and extradition;17 it was
clearly a law enforcement matter. In the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, six
people were killed and more than one thousand injured. HI Law enfo rcement officials
cond ucted an extensive investigation, resulting ultimately in the apprehension, extradition, trial and conviction in U.S. District Court of most of the suspects in the
bombing, including Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. 19 Again , we observe an unquestionably law enforcement response.
The 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
claimed the lives of twelve Americans and more than two hundred Kenyans and
Tanzanians.2o The United States conducted a one-strike military response,21 and
issued indictments against fifteen individuals, four of whom were apprehended by
foreign governments, extradited to the United States, and tried and convicted in
U.S. District Court.22 Despite the mixed military and law enforcement response,
law enforcement efforts appear to have been both p rimary and sustained, while the
military component was less significant and transitory.2)
In recent years, international efforts to address the law as it relates to terrorism
have yielded a nwnber of international agreements relevant to countering the terrorist threat. As with domestic legislation, however, these conventions also reflect
a predisposition toward law enforcement. The United States responded to the attack on the Khobar Towers complex housing U.S. military personnel in Saudi
Arabia both by launching a law enforcement investigation and by commencing an
international initiative that ultimately resulted in the negotiation and entry into
force of the Terrorist Bombing Convention.24 Through the United Nations, the
United States has attempted to shore up weaknesses in the law enforcement model
through treaties establishing a regime of aut dedere aut punire (extradite or prosecute) fo r terrorism offenses. 2S Other examples of the campaign to reinforce the
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law enforcement archetype in countering transnational armed groups include
U.S. support for the Terrorist Financing Convention and efforts toward a Nuclear
Terrorism Convention.26
Internationally, other countries traditionally rely on law enforcement to combat terrorism as well. Numerous countries, including Canada, France, Germany,
Israel, Colombia, Russia and the United Kingdom, have established programs to
combat terrorism that, while markedly different in organization and process, share
striking similarities: each vests primary responsibility for response to terrorist incidents in a designated central authority, typically its national or local police; each
embraces a national counterterrorism policy involving a variety of strategies, including intelligence collection, police presence and various physical security measures; and each primarily relies on its general criminal laws to prosecute terrorists,
although most also have specific terrorism-related laws that allow for special investigation or prosecution modalities and increased penalties. Taken together, these
components evidence an across-the-board, unambiguous reliance on the law enforcement paradigm in countering terrorism.2' The respective British and Spanish
responses to terrorist-sponsored suicide bombings in the London subway and Madrid's rail system confirmed Europe's staunch reliance on the law enforcement
model to fight terrorism. 28 And India's response to the Mumbai attack is indicative
of the paradigm's favored status even in conflict-torn South Asia. In the same vein,
the United States' choice of fora in which to prosecute persons accused in the first
few years after 9/ 11 was limited solely to the federal criminal court system.29
The fact that law enforcement was used in the past is not a compelling argument
for its post-9fll prevalence, however. The predominant global perspective immediately after 9/11 appears to have manifested itself as an acknowledgment that law
enforcement had failed. Generally, civilizations prefer to live in peace, addressing
minor, disruptive violence with law enforcement tools designed for a peaceful state
of existence. But no one was interested in status quo after 9/11. AI Qaeda had been
at war with the United States for years, but its attack of2001 changed the way that
conflict was viewed by others.
One could explain the United States' relatively unique post-9/11 shift as a
function of its relatively unique victimization at the time. But such a reading of
history would miss the mark. The United States still approaches terrorism as a law
enforcement matter; it is the distinct conflict with al Qaeda that is viewed differently. In the fall of2001, the United States went to war with al Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization with global reach, and its territorial sponsors, the
Taliban. In hindsight, having substantially degraded the organization and collected massive amounts of intelligence revealing al Qaeda's objectives and
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capabilities, it can be seen that only the massive effort that amounted to an armed
conflict could have brought down Osama bin Laden.

III. Identifyi ng the Problem
Acknowledging the confluence of legal regimes, we turn to the law governing
armed conflict, the lex specialis, which recognizes that in time of war there has been
a disruption of the peacetime legal regime.30 Because warfare is not new to human
experience, and the capture of enemy forces is certainly not unfamiliar to warfare,
one wouJd expect that traditional detention modalities might naturally prevail
without fanfare. But al Qaeda's war with the United States and its allies continues
to challenge both the initial choice-of-Iaw question and the limits of the constitutive tenets of the relevant bodies of law-tenets that largely defined international
and domestic orders throughout the last half of the twentieth century. Soon after
the United States put boots on the ground in Afghanistan, it became apparent that
many of the most fam iliar jus in bello precepts were simply inapplicable to, or inadequate for, armed conflict of this type-armed conflict with a transnational nonState organization employing terrorism as its modus operandi.
A graphic ma y assist in understanding and explaining the legal regimes in play
with respect to terrorist detention. This chart, artificial in that it does not exist in
any positive statement of international law, is nonetheless useful in reflecting the
disparate nature of applicable legal regimes that attend the detention of terrorists.
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The left side of the chart depicts the lex generalis of a peacetime society, labeled
"law of peace." On the right side is the lex specialisofthe law of war. As one continues down the left side, human rights law is identified as most relevant to detention
issues. And, more important, crossing the line into domestic implementation of
international norms, criminal procedure is depicted as the body oflaw that provided authority for terrorist criminal detention throughout most of the twentieth
century. It represents the body oflaw applicable to any criminal trial (whether by
federal court or military commission). It is the body oflaw to which habeas judges
naturally first looked in their initial Guantanamo cases, and it is the only body of
law on this chart that is constituent in the curriculum of every American law student. Even a law student who elects to study international law is more likely to focus on lex generalis than its less frequently utile wartime counterpart. Moreover, at
least in previous generations, jus in bello was likely to get short shrift relative to its
more engaging counterpart,jus ad bellum. That is changing, but the point is that
throughout m ost of the past decade, lawyers both in the United States and abroad
intuitively devolved to the criminal law model when seeking lawful justification
for the detention of terrorists.
Conversely, in the days following the establishment of the Guantanamo detention facility, very few even seemed to be aware that a wartim e model for terrorist
detention existed. Historically, the United States has not used the law of war model
for the detention of terrorists; the law enforcement model was the focus of
counterterrorism policies for the better part of the last half centlll)')! Few looked
to the law of armed conflict. And, as the empty boxes more significantly designate,
even were one to consult that body of law, one would find a paucity of domestic
implementing legislation associated with the authority to detain. Indeed, even a direct application of Geneva law yields no applicable positive authority to capture
and detain. Authority to capture is inferred, and while the Third Convention recognizes the propriety of internm ent for prisoners of war in international arm ed
conflict,32 such positive authority is absent for non-international armed conflict.
Finally, and most relevant to the international lawyer, a review of the law of war
standards applicable to this particular conflict reveals significant omissions.
Geneva law, especially as it pertains to detention, is focused on the treatment of
prisoners of war-a category principally constituted by members of the armed
forces of a State that is party to the Conventions, in conflict with another State
party to the Conventions.33 Rules applicable to a conflict " not of an international
character,"34 if that even accurately describes a conflict halfway around the world
in which the United States is joined by the armed forces of more than forty other
countries, are scant to say the least.35
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At its essence, the United States' first and most essential armed conflict at present is that against al Qaeda, a transnational armed group in which none of the
members qualify for prisoner of war status. ~ Thus, it is no surprise that few turned
to the law of war as the appropriate paradigm for the post-91I 1 detention of terrorists. And, even if the polity were completely immersed in the finer points of jus in
bello, we would find little positive authority or guidance for the detention of an enemy that does not qualify for prisoner of war protections under even the most expansive reading of the Third Geneva Convention, yet is indisputably the primary
adversary in the conflictY There are no "privileged belligerents" among those
whom the United States opposes.
Because of these unique circumstances, criticism of U.S. detention policiesmemorialized in iconic photographs from the early days ofGuantanamo Bay-was
initially embodied in a claim that the United States was " violating" the Geneva
Conventions. 38 These claims morphed into the slightly more defensible assertion
that this "global war on terror" was not even a war because the law of war did not
extend to this type of undefined conflict. Indeed, President Bush's moniker fueled
recrimination as the geographically unbounded nature of the term "global war on
terror" disquieted those already uncom fortable with U.S. assertions of jus ad
bellum authority to use the military instrument. 39 That the target of the application
of force was a common noun-terror---only further distanced the endeavor from
more traditional armed conflict.40
Nevertheless, we have had two U.S. presidents-separated by wide ideological
differences-similarly conclude that U.S. national security interests necessitate an
armed conflict with a transnational armed terrorist organization. 41 To jump then
to the conclusion that a radically different-and inherently unsuitable-peacetime
detention paradigm will work to bridge jus in bello's gaps, although conceptually attractive to a litigious society happily governed by the rule of law, is simply not
sustainable.
Proof of this is found in the Obama administration's attempt to close
Guantanamo Bay and its focused effort to scrutinize thoroughly the case of each
Guantanamo detainee. The U.S. government made every effort to diminish the
population of detainees at Guantanamo by identifying criminals for prosecution,
as well as candidates for release or transfer to another country.~2 And yet, despite
these truly unprecedented efforts, the senior-most members of the President's
national security team determined unanimously that at least forty-eight detainees
could be neither prosecuted nor transferred. 43 As President Obama described them
in his Archives speech, "[ t]hese are people who, in effect, remain at war with the
United States."44
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Some who cling to the polemic of past years may claim that the lot of these fortyeight detainees is simply a function of evidence so tainted by misdirected interrogation techniques that a successful prosecution option was rendered impossible.
But such an argument fails to further the effort to solve this complex problem, and
it fails to recognize the radically different purposes and circumstances that attend
the two disparate detention paradigms.
Looking to the legal regime associated with criminal procedure, the starting
point is liberty. In the United States, citizens walk freely in the streets u nless
arrested based on a police officer's probable cause belief that a crime has been
committed and the individual to be detained committed it. 45 Within forty-eight
hours, the arresting officer must convince an independent magistrate of that
probable cause;46 to avoid release on bail pending disposition of charges, a convincing case of dangerousness or flight risk must be made,47 a lawyer must be provided,48 Miratlda rights must be read 49 and a speedy trial dock begins to tick.S(Iln
order to convict a pretrial detainee of the underlying offense that led to his or her
detention, a prosecutor must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt everyelement of an offense for which the individual is charged. 51 Once this occurs, the
sentencing authority can decide whether to set the individual free, or whether
further detention (incarceration) of the individual is warranted. This is what
human rights law provides in the United States. Our domestic implementation is
far more refined and nuanced than the antecedent human rights law.
But in war, the starting point is radically different. A member ofthe enemy force
in armed conflict is free only to the extent that he or she can avoid death or capture
by the adversary. To a U.S. soldier, the enemy's starting point may be as a target.
Under the law of war, combatants may be lawfully shot dead simply for being a
member of the enemy force-there is no requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt that some past offense was committed. 52
In certain circumstances, that target might, as a discretionary matter, be captured rather than killed. 53 Were that to occur, it would make no sense suddenly to
"turn off' the wartime paradigm and switch to that oflaw enforcement, providing
all the process associated with criminal procedure. To do so would be the equivalent of telling the nineteen-year-old recruit, "You have legal authority to kill another human being, but if you capture him instead, you had better collect enough
evidence to prove him guilty of a crime in a courtroom." Making it more complex
to capture a person in combat by adding additional obligations could incentivize
killing-ironically and perversely-in the name of human rights. SoI
One might concl ude that the answer is simply applying the law of war, but that
in turn provides very little regulation and permits indefinite detention with no
readily foreseeable end. Unlike the State-on -State conflict for which the 1949
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Geneva Conventions were written, in the current conilict, combatants are more
difficult to recognize and the "end" of hostilities is anything but easily identified or
predicted. At the end of World War II, more than four h undred thousand enemy
soldiers were incarcerated within the continental United States in a state ofindefi nite detention, yet all knew that the war and their concomitant detention would
end upon surrender. Enemy soldiers at that time, mostly conscripted, could be released to return to their former lives. The end of to day's conflict, however, will be
far more difficult to identify, both in timing and in circumstance. And instead of
conscripts, al Qaeda is manned by a highly committed volunteer force. When does
this conflict end? When all senior al Qaeda leaders are killed or surrender?
The Geneva Conventions, written more than a half century ago, simply were not
designed for the present conflict. And even if they had been, the past sixty years
have witnessed countless enhancements to criminal procedure on the hwnan
rights side of the chart, but almost no refmements to the law of war side.55 Were we
to reconfigure the law of war to address today's conflict, we would condition the
date and time of release of the detainees on some criteria other than the "end of
hostilities." We would be forced to come to grips with some sort of individualized
assessment as to when hostilities have ended for each individual detainee.
This body of law associated with the conduct of warfare is naturally far less developed than that attending law enforcement. Its constituting documents were
drafted in the 1940s, before the nature of the present conflict was even envisaged. It
is natural that jurists would initially look to the far more refined and nuanced
criminal procedure to address issues of detention. Indeed, some who have grasped
the paradigmatic disparity have daimed that the fact that the law of war does not
more fully address relevant detention issues means that human rights norms m ust
apply as a matter oflaw.
But the dearth of applicable guidance does not necessarily militate in favor of
shifting to lexgeneralis; the normative gaps are not related to the authority to detain
itself. No one questions kinetic targeting authority in non-international armed
conflict, and a corollary must be that such authority subsumes the authority to capture and detain. Hwnan rights law applicable to detention is d early oriented toward the steady-state peacetime regime internal toa State's borders. To apply these
rules to overseas wartime circumstances is the equivalent of applying a highway
speed limit to an aircraft. That there is no agreed speed limit for aircraft is certainly
not a cogent argument to demand application of automobile limits; the circumstances are plainly different.
The fact is, however, that human rights norms are far more relevant to wartime
detention than is the speed limit analogy above-but not as a legal requirement.
Regardless of whether there exists an applicable regulatory scheme, we have
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learned that our more refined twenty-first-century sensibilities wouJd accord a detainee far more process than wouJd have been deemed sufficient in another era.
Even if appropriate norms had not evolved in favor of process-and they have-unique aspects of this conflict, likely lack of certainty with respect to the status of
persons captured and ambiguity attending the end of the hostilities in which they
are taking part, all point to the need for a process to provide the missing clarity. For
those who believe such a process should be dictated as a matter oflaw, one wouJd
have to conclude that the law of war itself is in need of attention.
The complexity at the joinder of detention policy and law is self-evident as a
function of political history. But before leaving the subject a few more observations
are apropos. It is worth noting that the controversy is most fundamentally premised on this dissonance in the available legal regimes and not in the political policy differences that have, unfortunately, captured headlines for the better part of a
decade. In today's counterterrorism conflict, the United States is dealing with persons who are, at once, m embers of the enem y force in war and criminals involved
in heinous acts of terrorism. The underlying basis for detention is substantiallybut subtly----different for each regime. The law enforcement model is oriented toward punishment for a prior crim e; the law of war model serves to protect against a
future threat. Under the law of war, the newly minted recruit is legally just as deserving of capture and detention as is the experienced war criminal. But only the
latter may be worthy of prosecution. One paradigm results in punishment and then
only after the adjudication of proofbeyond a reasonable doubt of culpability for past
ads. The other detains as a protective measure after a showing of future threat, most
likely imputed from affiliation.
This confluence of applicable bases for detention and attendant legal paradigms
is the primary complicating factor in twenty-fust-century detention policy. It resounds in the application of old laws to new wars-the counterterrorism conflict
that pits the United States against an enemy dedicated to killing its citizens and
eradicating the American way of life, an enemy whose members, if captured in a
traditional State-on-State conilict, would be characterized as prisoners of war. The
detention authority derives from their status as belligerents-the same status that
would have justified targeting them for kinetic strike had they not been fortunate
enough to have been captured in the alternative. Each is held because of the threat he
poses if released, not as punishment for anything he may have done. Although this
amounts to the principal point of confusion in recent years, U.S. detention policy is
further complicated by the multiplicity of conflicts in which it is presently engaged.
The war against al Qaeda is not the only one by which the detention landscape
of the past decade has been colored. Further complicating the scene are the
counterinsurgency that we would like to believe is at its denouement in Iraq and
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the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan that is conceived of differently by the more than forty allies who battle at the side of the United States. Even
Additional Protocol II,S6 were it applicable, would offer a paucity of guidance for
regulating detention in non-international armed conflict.
More important, the existence of a non-international armed conflict may itself
be a matter of controversy. Very few countries have or will concede that their internal
security issues amount to internal armed conflicts. To do so is to call into question
the very ability of an executive to govern his or her nation. And the end-state goal
of any counterinsurgency is transition to the lex generalis, or law of peace, which
provides for detention of terrorist insurgents onl y as a matter of law enforcement.
In States like Iraq the executive is unlikely ever to concede there to be a conflict that
would justify law of war detention. If al Qaeda were based in New Mexico, the Federal Bureau of Investigation most likely would be handling detention policy as a
law enforcement matter. Foreign armed forces normally are deemed to be engaged
in armed conflict or occupation only if acting outside of the parameters of the
domestic laws and consent of the host State.
Further, the nature of counterinsurgency is such that success means ultimately
winning the hearts and minds of insurgent sympathizers because, unlike the expulsion of foreign attackers, the end state of any successful suppression of insurgency
involves peaceful coexistence with the previous adversary. As a consequence, for
any number of reasons, it is most useful to shift as quickly as possible to a law enforcement regime that treats insurgent combatants as criminals to be dealt with by
a peacetime criminal justice system.
This was reflected by U.S. policy toward, and eventually the legal authorities associated with, the conflict in Iraq. As a general rule, capture and detention that
took place during the latter portion of the U.S. presence in Iraq was conducted under a warrant-based program that accorded fully with Iraqi domestic law. Similarly, current initiatives in Afghanistan are taking the conflict, perhaps
inextricably, in the direction of a law enforcement paradigm that mayor may not
serve counterinsurgency interests depending on how it is implemented-a challenge commanders must resolve on the ground. But for purposes of this discussion, the point is that the m ovement toward law enforcement operations is a
function of the peculiarities of the military mission; it is not required by the rule of
law even though it has the unfortunate collateral effect of furthering the confusion
associated with the disparate legal regimes.
If Iraq sits on the law enforcement side of the chart depicting the various paradigms for the detention of terrorists, with Guantanamo firmly occupying the position on the law of war side (except for the individual cases of criminals who may be
brought to justice through criminal proceedings), then Afghanistan sits between
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the two. Law of war authorities are presently employed to capture terrorists, but ultimately the peacetime society for which Afghans yearn will need to rely on the law
enforcement model.
And, as a final complicating factor supplementing those mentioned above-the
historic preference for addressing terrorism through the law enforcement paradigm, gaps in the law of war and the unique mandates of counterinsurgency-it
cannot be forgotten that the world's perceptions of these evolving policies have
been immeasurably impacted by Abu Ghraib and the inevitable association of the
reprehensible crimes that took place there with the detention of terrorists at
Guantanamo and with every other aspect of U.S. detention policy. This is truly an
instance of bad facts putting the United States at risk for bad law. The President's
actions in clearly prohibiting certain inappropriate interrogation practices57 and
affirming a commitment to transparency5Sin detention operations are steps in the
right direction. International lawyers must be careful not to confuse these matters,
which need attention in every armed conflict, with the more recondite developments that characterizetwenty-first-century armed conflict with transnational terrorist organizations.

N . Identifying the Solution
If the taint associated with U.S. detention policy were merely an issue of previous
missteps or failed policies, it could have been corrected long ago. But too many
have sought a quick answer, either by misapplying the law of war or inappropriately looking to a peacetime legal regime to justify all detention practices-filling
regulatory gaps with an entirely different body oflaw that was drafted for radically
different circumstances. Ifwar is the correct paradigm, but extant law of war does
not fit the current conflict, it follows that the law of war should be adjusted to fit
present circwnstances.
An adjustment to the law may follow logically, but it is not necessarily the only
solution . Some would argue that international "law" is not always needed if
sufficient principles exist to guide nations into morally responsible behavior that
appropriately balances military and humanitarian interests. This article takes no
position on the advisability of changing the law of war. Instead, it assumes that regardless of the future legal requirements, the first step is to identify and implement
policies that fit the current circumstances and, assuming a law-making exercise or
development of custom could follow, can usefully inform that future .
The starting point for this discussion is a speech by President Obama in May of
2009 regarding detention policies in the most controversial locationGuantanamo Bay. The fundamental theme of the President's remarks was his
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affirmation that U.S. detention policies are, and will be, guided by the rule oflaw
and Am erican values. He asserted the importance of American leadership in the international community and in the development of principled legal a uthorities to
guide the evolution of international law.
Applying American values to the new circum stances of twenty-first-century
armed conflict, law of war detentio n is a valid and morally necessary component of
the war fighting effort. That authority cannot be encum bered by a requirement to
detain only when a criminal case for past acts can be proven. On the other hand, indefinite detention cannot proceed with the simplicity that accompanies the detention of conventional prisoners of war. This conflict suffers from lack of clarity
regarding both the "who" and "when" for long-term detention. That weakness,
then, is best rectified by the establishment of a dear process from which both the
government and the detainee can benefit.
This understanding is not completely new. In prior years Combatant Status Review Tribunals have been used to assess the basis of Guantanam o detentions case
by case and Adm inistrative Review Boards have been used to assess the continuing
necessity of detention on the basis of threat. Both processes had weaknesses, and as
a consequence, both have been discarded, the gap having been partially filled with
habeas litigation and Periodic Review Boards. Similarly, experience has led to significant developments that have radically im proved the review processes for both
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Today, newly captured individuals are submitted to a Detainee Review Board.
The Board, comprised of three field-grade military officers, reviews each individual's detention for both legality and necessity of continued detentio n. The detainee
receives expert assistance from a U.S. officer who is authorized access to all reasonably available informatio n pertaining to that detainee. This review is repeated periodically after the initial hearing, which must take place within sixty days of arrival
at the internment facility. Similar improvements are forthcoming in Guantanam o.
The President 's 2009 executive order s9 lays out an even mo re rob ust process
oriented toward assessing the continued threat of those detained at Guantanam o
who alread y have received access to habeas review in federal courts.
Although som e may prefer the certainty associated with a legally imposed review requirement, today the United States benefits from the ability to address the
issue as a policy m atter-learning from experience that never could have been accurately predicted. Experience is necessary because it is so important to preserve
the requisite yet delicate equipoise between military necessity and humanitarian
interests. Skewing that equipoise undermines the entire purpose of the law of war.
International h umanitarian law serves humanitarian interests only if adhered to,
and only if adherence serves humanitarian goals. Failing to detain and detaining
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for too short or too long a period miss both the humanitarian and m ilitary necessity marks. The correct process can guide us to those objectives, however.
The fact that the subject of U.S. detention policy has provided fodder for so
much discussion among lawyers, policymakers and the public, as well as active involvement by the White House, the courts and Congress, is testament to its continued timeliness and paramount importance. The legaUpolicy regime that emerges
from this era will likely forever alter the way nation -States apply the rule of law in
combating external or transnational terrorist threats. If properly nuanced, this
framework could effectively maximize the likelihood of success in combating terrorism , while preserving and protecting the human rights and civil liberties that
define civilized society.
Sadly, to some, the fits and starts that have thus far characterized this regime's
birth and infancy portend neither counterterrorism success nor preservation of
civil liberties. U.S. policy with respect to the detention of terrorists has been confused for nearly a decade. It has resulted in criticism from adversaries and allies
alike. It has been the focus of heated debate within the national polity. And it was
one of the first matters on which President Obama took action after his inauguration. But for these very reasons, there may be hope.
The last ten years have not only provided the clarity of hindsight to identify the
need fo r change; they have provided the benefit of time and impetus for the pendulum to swing in both directions. The United States has been accused of holding innocents in legal black holes60 and of prematurely releasing terrorists so they can
ret urn again to attack 05. 61 It has been accused both of abusing detainees and of
coddling them.
Optimism should not derive from a new discovery, or a political cure easily administered after an election shifts the polity in one direction or the other. But , at
its heart, this is not a political issue; it is one benefitted by years of experience in trying to find the right answer. Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "[TJhe life of the
law has not been logic; [butt experience."62 Intem ational lawyers need not only the
creativity, energy and persistence that have so well served this nation as it tackled
problems in the past-and all of those are needed; also needed is the kind of wisdom that in some cases derives from experience alone. After nearly a decade of trial
and error, as the beneficiary of that experience that reaches beyond the limits of
human logic, the United States is now better situated than ever to get this right.

v . Conclusion
Anyone who claims the detainee policy problem to be easy does not understand it.
Past policies have not always served U.S. interests, but the problem is not a binary
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one, where one failed solution isolates its antithesis as "the" right answer. But there
are principles, honed in the crucible of the last decade, to which one can look for
guidance. Twenty-first-century sensibilities will not stomach indefinite detention
without process. But if the military instrument is used as a function of armed confli ct, kinetic targeting authorities cannot and should not be disconnected from detention authorities. Countries that defer to a requirement for criminal proof in
making targeting decisions in war are unlikely to be on the winning side.
The war against al Qaeda and its afftliates is not yet at an end, and it cannot be allowed to proceed without a principled, sustainable and credible detention policy,
one that will serve as an example for the international community as well. In September 2010, President Jakob Kellenberger of the International Committee of the
Red Cross delivered a speech in Geneva in which he announced an initiative to update the Geneva Conventions.63 The law of war is indeed in transition-perhaps
even to a degree evoking the era of post-Westphalian peacet>4 or the order emerging
from the chaos of World War 11.6s It goes without saying that lawyers should consciously and conscientiously seek to impact this change.
A failure to participate thoughtfully and deliberately in fashioning the legal
norms that are being developed-norms that will guide the global community for
the next century-would constitute a missed opportunity of substantial moment.
As former British Defence Minister John Reid asserted in April of 2006,
we owe it to ourselves, to our people. to our forces. and to the cause ofintemational order to constantly reappraise and update the relationship between our underlying val ues, the legal instruments which apply them to the world of conflict, and the historical
circumstances in which they areto be applied or "we risk continuing to fight a 21st century conflict with 20th century rules.»66
The terrorist attacks of9111 thrust the United States into a crisis of historic proportion. In such crises, leaders seize on international lawyers to analyze courses of
action with a view to determining their legality. Lawyers are charged to identify,
apply and distinguish norms relevant to the situation. Such norms are frequently
of long-standing pedigree, their principles having been established in code and
treaty and evolved over decades through critical assessment and practical
application.
On rare occasions. however, the internationa1lawyer's skill must be exercised
not only in the interpretation and application of extant law. b ut also in the conception and establishment of new law. And. on yet rarer occasions-watersheds of history-national and global interests rise or fall on the establishment of that new
normative construct, rendering the legal exercise in itself the object of national
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strategy and perhaps even an imperative component of international order. At
these seminal divides, lawyers m ust be poised not only to advise o n what may be legally permissible, b ut also to envision what is legally necessary and desirable, both
in the day at hand and in the new epoch . Now is such a watershed m oment.
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